


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
1 March 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


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Cuba--Bloc: [The Castro regime may be seeking to reduce its dependence on Soviet bloc technicians and specialists.]

[Cuban chiefs of mission in the West have received urgent instructions to recruit technical and professional specialists in non-bloc countries to "help build socialism in Cuba." The instructions emphasized that the task had been assigned by Fidel Castro personally and is to receive the highest priority, [redacted]]

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[The chiefs of mission were also asked to explore the possibilities of buying complete factories and various types of industrial equipment. In addition, they are to forward to Havana a wide variety of printed material on scientific and technical subjects.]

[The only political criteria for the selection of the specialists is that they be sympathetic to the Cuban revolution and have "progressive ideas." Cuba will pay them the same salaries now being paid "foreign technicians currently engaged in equivalent work in Cuba." However, especially well-qualified personnel may be granted higher salaries.]

[redacted] continuing arrivals in Cuba of agricultural and industrial specialists from the Soviet bloc. Although there have been sporadic indications of Cuban dissatisfaction with some categories of bloc technicians, Cuba's need for technical help is such that newly recruited Western personnel probably would, at least for the time being.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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25X1 [ ]  
[ ] supplement rather than replace the estimated 3,000  
bloc nonmilitary specialists now in the country. [ ]

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[ ] Castro devoted a considerable portion of his  
22-23 February speech to the great need for more  
and better-qualified personnel to staff various gov-  
ernment activities. The new recruitment program,  
if successful, would tend to reduce over-all Soviet  
influence in the Cuban economy. [ ] 25X1 25X1  
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**\*Sino-Soviet Relations:** A further intensification of Chinese polemics against the USSR is heralded in a Red Flag article that is being reprinted in four parts beginning in this morning's People's Daily.

The article is the longest diatribe against Soviet policy to appear in People's Daily in the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute. While the full text is not available, the summary of the article issued by Peiping indicates that it is one of the most vituperative that the Chinese have published.

The article is part of a continuing Chinese effort to demonstrate the hypocrisy of recent Soviet talks about "unity." Cast as an attack on Italian party leader Togliatti, it declares that he and "other comrades" call for an end to polemics but are in fact bent on continuing the public controversy. "Well then," the article declares, "let it continue."

Peiping implies that the USSR fears continuation of the debate will weaken Soviet influence in the Communist world. The article implicitly accuses the Soviets of being "mortally afraid" to publicize the Chinese arguments. It goes on to charge: "They are even using a powerful station to jam our broadcasts."

The Chinese are still equivocal in their response to Khrushchev's bid for preliminary talks to prepare for an international Communist conference. On 27 February, however, Peiping indicated that such talks would not succeed in their purpose short of complete Soviet capitulation.

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USSR--Nuclear Test Ban: The deputy chief of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva disarmament talks, Roshchin, has contended that "neither the USSR nor the US" wants a test-ban treaty "at just this time."

In a private conversation on 27 February with a US official, Roshchin, who recently returned from Moscow after personal consultations with Khrushchev, asserted that the Soviet leader "personally" reviewed all Soviet disarmament texts before they were tabled and kept himself relatively well briefed on all disarmament topics.

Roshchin suggested that there might be "another look" at the nuclear test problem after an Easter recess, which he proposed for 11 April to 6 May.


Roshchin was "positive" that there would "never" be agreement on a test ban if the West remained firm on its requirement of seven on-site inspections. He did not, however, repeat the usual position that Moscow would not move from its offer of three inspections.



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West Germany - Yugoslavia: [West Germany has decided to take several steps to improve relations with Yugoslavia.]

[Bonn intends to make the following approaches to the Yugoslavs within a few days: (a) a new offer for compensation in Nazi medical experiment cases; (b) a reply to the Yugoslav note regarding the bombing last fall of the Yugoslav mission in Bonn; and (c) a proposal for a German-Yugoslav commission on trade.]

[Bonn also intends to look into the questions of linking Yugoslavia with the EEC and OECD, but has emphasized to US officials that it cannot go very far in helping to meet Yugoslavia's economic needs.]

[On 22 February, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official told a US diplomat that Belgrade would not launch an anti-German campaign if Bonn gave evidence of a real desire to improve bilateral relations in its response to Yugoslav complaints.]

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Britain: Labor Party leader Harold Wilson has again displayed his hostility toward the Nassau agreements and indicated that he and his colleagues would not carry out certain of its provisions if they come to power.

Speaking [ ] to [ ] press correspondents in London, Wilson demurred at saying Labor's attitude amounts to repudiation of the agreement, and indicated he prefers to think in terms of its "renegotiation." However, Wilson indicated that a Labor government would not purchase Polaris missiles from the US and would build no missile submarines. The money saved, he said, could be used for expansion and modernization of British conventional forces.

With regard to West German participation in a multilateral nuclear force, Wilson said that having "German fingers on the trigger" should be avoided because it would provoke the Soviet Union. He refused to be pinned down by the correspondents, however, on how far a government he might lead would oppose West German participation in a pooled and controlled NATO deterrent program.

Regarding any future UK-EEC negotiations, Wilson indicated these would have to start with a completely "new deal." He did not associate himself or his party with fresh initiatives in this field. [ ]

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NOTES

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] **\*Belgium:** Spaak believes he has a good chance of obtaining parliamentary approval for Belgian participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force if both Germany and Italy also participate. Spaak has indicated to the US ambassador that the failure of either country to join would very substantially reduce the chances of Belgian participation, even if costs, another essential factor, proved manageable. [REDACTED]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

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